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Abstract 
The emergence of network technologies and the appearance of 
new varied applications in terms of services and resources, has 
created new security problems for which existing solutions and 
mechanisms are inadequate, especially problems of identification 
and authentication. In a highly distributed and pervasive system, 
a uniform and centralized security management is not an option. 
It then becomes necessary to give more autonomy to security 
systems by providing them with mechanisms that allows a 
dynamic and flexible cooperation and collaboration between the 
actors in the system. 
Keywords: Pervasive Systems, Identity protection, 
identification/authentication, collaborative security mechanism. 
1. Introduction 
The rapid development of mobile computing has given rise 
to ubiquitous information systems: the user has at any time, 
access to the global network regardless of location or time 
("anywhere - anytime" access).  
"Pervasive" is a term that can be approximated with the 
idea of ubiquity or flooding. The idea of pervasive network 
would evoke a ubiquitous network.  
The Ubiquitous (or pervasive) network allows a permanent 
connection of communicating devices that automatically 
recognize and locate themselves together, because they are 
"intelligent" objects. It evokes the notion of ambient 
intelligence.  
The objects of the system are thus able to identify, store 
and interact naturally. But this use is made possible thanks 
to the wired and wireless connections, and also thanks to 
the possibility of interaction of objects together.  
The challenge of pervasive systems is in this perspective, 
to provide methodological frameworks and protocols to 
permit the reliable, relevant and efficient use of these 
systems [1].  
The large diversity of means of connection and 
communication conditions, added to that, the heterogeneity 
of devices, displays the data to the attacks on several 
levels. This requires, in fact, to provide tools for securing 
the system and to protect the identity of users. But this new 
trend reveals new security problems for which solutions 
and existing mechanisms are inadequate, especially for the 
problems of identification and authentication. In a highly 
distributed and pervasive system, a centralized and 
homogenous security management is not conceivable. It 
then becomes necessary to give more autonomy to security 
systems, providing them with mechanisms allowing a 
dynamic and flexible cooperation and collaboration 
between the actors in the system. This paper will be an 
overview of the main existing security systems and 
compare their effectiveness and their ability to meet the 
constraints of our problem. 
We will present a first step, the requirements in terms of 
constraints and security needs of pervasive environments. 
Then, we will describe methods for authorization and 
standard modules used in the design of a distributed and 
collaborative security architecture. Subsequently, different 
solutions proposed for identification and authentication 
management will be studied, and their ability to meet the 
needs shown in the third part of the evaluated paper. 
Finally, a generic architecture of a security mechanism 
based on reputation and trust level will be proposed. 
2. Security needs of pervasive systems 
2.1 Decentralization 
Security policy in a distributed system must be as 
decentralized as possible. Indeed, the user must be able to 
prove his/her identity anywhere in the environment without 
seeking systematically the centralized server of its parent 
organization. 
2.2 Interoperability and Interaction 
With the expansion of computer networks, the interaction, 
the federation and the cooperation between different 
organizations are prime prospects. The heterogeneity is 
one of the basic characteristics of pervasive applications. 
To design a security system allowing interaction and 
collaboration between disparate organizations is the closest 
alternative to reality. 
  
2.3 Trust spread 
The notion of trust is widely used in existing security 
systems, which allows delegating the mechanisms 
management of identification, authentication and 
authorization to several terminals. For example, a user is 
acquiring rights of access to organisms resources other 
than his/her parent organisms as long as these 
organizations know and trust each other, they can then 
work safely. But if that user moves to another organism, 
which is not known of his/her parent organism; he/she may 
be denied access to the resources, despite his/her status. 
2.4 Traceability and non-repudiation 
With the expansion of computer networks, the interaction, 
the federation and the cooperation between different 
organizations are prime prospects. The heterogeneity is 
one of the basic characteristics of pervasive applications. 
To design a security system allowing interaction and 
collaboration between disparate organizations is the closest 
alternative to reality. 
 2.5 Autonomy 
Each user should be able to move independently across 
pervasive domains and to acquire rights without going 
through his/her original organism. 
 
2.6 Transparency and Proactivity 
In a ubiquitous environment, each entity must be able to 
authenticate itself and to acquire rights in an easy and 
transparent way. In addition, the resources used must seek 
the user as seldom as possible. 
2.7 Flexibility 
Certificates are the most used to identify an entity in a 
distributed system. However, the emergence of new 
technologies such as biometrics, RFID, forces the 
pervasive systems to integrate different means of 
identification, and adapt authentication mechanisms in 
relation to the context of the user, such as the ability and 
the type of the device used. 
2.8 Privacy protection 
In pervasive environment, a large amount of information 
(public or private) flows in networks. These data can 
provide information on preferences and the user’s 
behavior, and can be misused. To remedy this fault, the 
user’s device must have the ability to recognize the 
environment in which they are located, and to evaluate its 
degree of confidence. Only necessary and sufficient 
information for the identification / authentication will be 
available. 
2.9 Scaling 
One of the main challenges in pervasive systems is to 
allow interaction between different organizational entities. 
In other words, a pervasive security system is able to scale 
as long as it can accept an increasing number of new users. 
3. Standard security modules 
This section will aim to define certain types of 
authorization modes and standards security modules, 
required for establishing a security architecture manages 
the identification, authentication and access control, in 
order to understand the functioning of the different security 
systems that will be presented later. 
3.1 Authorization modes 
Three modes of authorization have been proposed by RFC 
2904 [2]: agent mode, Pull mode, and Push mode. 
 Agent mode 
The authorization server acts as an intermediary (agent) 
between the user and the resource. The request of the user 
and the response of the resource go through the 
authorization server, which decides whether to allow 
access or not to the resource according to the policy 
associated to the user. 
 Pull mode  
In this mode, the resource requested by the user is directly 
sought. This refers to its authorization server to check 
whether this user is allowed to use it. Thus, if the answer is 
positive, the resource provides access to the user 
depending on the rights approved by the authorization 
server. 
 Push mode 
In this model, the user acts as an intermediary. A contact is 
first established with the authorization server, which 
delivers to the authorized user an access token (certificate); 
then this certificate is used as proof of the user’s rights to 
utilize the resource. 
3.2 Generic modules of a security system 
From the RFCs (2904, [2] 3084 [3]), we can decompose a 
Security System Into Four Main modules: 
 PIP (Policy Information Point): This section 
contains all data relative to users, resources, 
environment, etc… 
  
 PAP (Policy Access Point): The policy of access 
control is defined in this module; it describes the 
rules to assign rights to each entity of the domain. 
 PDP (Policy Decision Point): This module is in 
charge of processing requests, it first performs the 
collection of certain information related to the 
request from the PIP and PAP, and subsequently 
decides to accept or reject this request. 
 PEP (Policy Enforcement Point): Plays the role of 
an interface of the security policy. It is 
responsible for receiving the users’ requests, 
manage authentication and return the response 
made by the PDP. 
4. Identity and privilege management systems 
This section will be a state of the art of the main security 
systems providing the authentication and the access 
control. Existing solutions can be categorized into two sub-
sections: Systems based on identity management, and 
systems that manage the authentication mechanism and the 
privileges. 
4.1 Systems based on identity management 
4.1.1 Radius [4] 
 
The user sends an Access-Request containing his/her 
authentication information, and sends it to the server. The 
server processes the request locally if it recognizes the 
user, otherwise, it acts as a RADIUS Proxy "or 
intermediate" by transmitting it to another server. 
Exchanges are made via the chain of Radius Proxy servers 
intermediate in one direction and then in the other. When 
the request arrives at the Radius server corresponding the 
identification item, it validates the request or refuse it by 
sending a Access-Accept or Access-Reject packet. 
RADIUS operates in agent mode. Permissions 
management exists but remains basic. The main advantage 
of RADIUS is the deployment of inter-domain relations, 
by propagating information from one server to another. 
Otherwise, the decisions remain binary (Accept, Reject) 
and trust between the intermediate servers is not taken into 
account. 
 
4.1.2 LemonLDAP[5] 
 
Two connection modes exist for this approach, the pull 
mode, and the agent mode. In the pull mode, when a user 
wants to access a protected application, the system asks the 
user’s name and password. Thus, after a successful 
authentication, the user is redirected to the resource that 
he/she seeks. In agent mode, the authenticated user 
accesses a menu containing all the applications on which 
he has access permissions. LemonLDAP is suitable for 
small organizations. Its centralized Single Sign On 
management prevents scaling and its inability to ensure 
interoperability between different security policies makes 
this solution unsuitable for large structures. 
 
4.1.3 OpenID  
 
OpenID [6] is a solution that permits to federate unique 
authentications and share attributes. It provides the ability 
to authenticate to multiple sites using a unique identifier 
OpenID. This model works in pull mode, and required to 
establish beforehand, trust relationships between service 
providers (websites, forums, messaging using OpenID) and 
identity providers (OpenID providers).. 
The main advantages of OpenID are its ability to protect 
the users’ attributes and traceability of the acount 
movement  that can benefit the  owner. 
Otherwise, OpenID requires to the new users to drop all 
their existing accounts by creating a new account managed 
by their new supplier. Finally, OpenID is not working on 
push mode (offline). 
 
4.1.4 Liberty Alliance 
 
Liberty Alliance [7] proposes to combine the requirements 
of strong authentication (authentication of multiple 
attributes) by respecting the user’s privacy. Just like 
OpenID, Liberty Alliance allows the users with a single 
account to access multiple services from different 
providers, but under the condition that they must belong to 
the same "circle of trust". The strong point of Liberty 
Aliance, is the separation between identity providers and 
service providers, which gives them more freedom to 
administer their resources. However, Liberty Aliance 
accuses the same problems suffered by OpenID. 
 
4.1.5 Shibboleth   
 
Shibboleth [8] is an authentication mechanism, which 
adopts the pull mode in its allocation of access rights. It 
permits to federate the identification and supply, as the 
mechanisms presented above, two possible applications: 
authentication delegation and sharing attributes. Shibboleth 
provides a cooperative aspect that makes his great strength. 
Contrary to what was seen previously, a user in this 
system, can use his/her original accounts to authenticate in 
any organization that trusts its parent organization, without 
being obliged to create a new account. However, the 
collaboration is limited to parties that have established 
explicit trust relationships, fault of consideration of 
extending the security policy in the design phase. 
 
  
4.1.6 WS Security 
 
WS-Security [9] is a security protocol called "point to 
point", which is dedicated to the message exchange of 
information between web services. Based on a mechanism 
of security tokens, it is associated with digital signatures to 
authenticate messages. Security tokens provide the identity 
of the message sender, which is proved by an 
authentication mechanism. The goal of WS-Security is to 
provide the users with a transparent and flexible 
authentication protocol, allowing different authentication 
modes from different organizations to interact. In addition 
to the ability to interconnect different security policies. 
This means, a user is authorized to use a service just if 
there is a rule that gives him/her the right in a explicit 
manner. But, the service administrator cannot know all the 
entities of the environment, which restricts access to a 
subset of users known directly. 
4.2 Systems based on privilege management 
4.2.1 Akenti  
 
Akenti [10] is an architecture designed to provide security 
services in a completely distributed environnement. It 
defines two types of certificates: 
 X.509 identity certificates: to identify a user. 
 The attribute certificates, which are divided 
into two sub-categories: 
– User certificates: containing the conditions of 
access to a resource. 
– Authorization certificates: that list for each 
resource the various administrators 
authorized to create  certificates of use for the 
concerned resource. 
This mechanism works in push mode, in which the user 
requests a certificate authority, granting him/her the right 
to use the resource. The strength of Akenti is the autonomy 
offered to the user who has the right to negotiates access to 
a resource, by using authorization certificates. However, its 
limitation lies in the fact that for each resource, the user 
will need a certificate if he wants to use the push mode. In 
addition, the spread of trust is not implemented by Akenti. 
 
4.2.2 Permis 
 
Permis [11] includes a mechanism of static authority 
delegation. Thus, each actor defines trust authorities 
having the right to assign roles. In addition, a new version 
of Permis (2006), can delegate authority dynamically, by 
creating a chain of delegation. The spread of trust by the 
chain of delegation is considered as a breakthrough in the 
Permis project. It allows the extension of security policies, 
but obliges the authorities delegated to describe manually 
the trusted entities who can take advantage of privileges by 
the delegation. 
 
4.2.3 CAS 
 
CAS (Community Authorization Service) [12] is a protocol 
dedicated to control management in virtual organizations 
(VO) like grid computing. CAS assumes the role of 
supreme authority of a virtual organization and allows to 
manage resources and users between organizations 
working together in a common project. The principle is to 
delegate the management of certain resources that belong 
to various member organizations of the same VO to CAS 
server which manages the virtual organization. A user 
affiliated with the VO requests a certificate, called "Proxy 
Certificate" awarded by the CAS server of the 
corresponding community. This allows any entity to verify 
the authenticity of the certificate and allows the holder to 
access the resource indicated by the same certificate. 
Cooperation between CAS servers is a real evolution and 
opens the door to the development of a collaborative 
security system. However, each VO has a centralized 
server that manages the correspondence (mapping) 
between a static member fields, and cannot create them or 
evaluate them dynamically. 
 
4.2.4 Voms  
 
Virtual Organization Management Service [13] closely 
resembles the CAS and can operate in both push  and pull 
modes. The major difference lies in the authorization 
mechanism. Indeed, like if in CAS, the attributes 
concerning the list of roles and groups members of the VO 
are stored in the voms server, the authorization rules are 
presented in the resource, that obtains the power to decide 
the user’s right. In summary, this system considers the 
resource owner (not the administrator of the , as in CAS) is 
the entity responsible for the implementation of his/her 
security policy. However, the implementation of the VO is 
done via a centralized server as in CAS, and the 
interconnection of the VOs is not supported by voms, 
weakening the scope of the interconnection mechanism. 
 
4.2.5 O2O  
 
O2O [14] (Organization to Organization) is a security 
system for building a VO from several VPOs (Virtual 
Private Organizations). Like a VPN (Virtual Private 
Network), an VPO creates a bridge between two 
organizations. The policy of access control uses the same 
federation mechanism as Liberty Aliance, so that a unique 
profile can be attributed to each member an organization 
(the profile assigned by the original organism) and can 
thereby take advantages of the privileges with the 
  
organizations linked to this VPO gateway. As in the CAS 
system, the formation of a VO is achieved by gathering the 
different policies of each VPO in a centralized server to 
avoid conflicts that can cause alliances. O2O is an 
interesting mechanism in the way that it allows to build 
links between organizations in a decentralized manner. 
However, the extension of the system by transitivity links 
between VOs, through a centralization which is restrictive 
for the collaboration between them. 
 
4.2.6 Sygn  
 
In sygn [15] permissions are defined in the form of 
certificates stored at the owner. For the creation of such 
permissions, no interaction with a centralized system is 
necessary, which makes it one of the Sygn’s strengths. 
Sygn also offers the possibility to define a permission on a 
set of resources. Sygn set up a decentralized architecture 
and reduces the interaction with trusted third parties. 
However, and as Permis system, the extension of trust 
occurs only through the delegation. 
 
4.2.7 GAIA OS 
 
GAIA OS Security [16] authenticates the user through 
different devices and protocols. A number between 0-1 is 
assigned to each device after authentication, which 
represents a measure of trust in the device or protocol. 
Thus, for a user to improve his/her reputation in the eyes of 
the system, he/she can combine several protocols to 
confirm his/her identity in order to increase the trust value 
associated with his/her (strong authentication). The 
advantage of GAIA OS, and in contrast to the mechanisms 
seen previously, is that the entity is measured digitally and 
not binary. 
In addition, the collaboration between organizations is not 
taken into account, the delegation is the only supported, 
which reduces the application of security policy to the 
local domain only. 
 
4.2.8 TrustAC 
 
Trust-Based Access Control system [17] can control access 
through a mechanism estimating trust. In this system, the 
device of the user maintains its own security policy. Each 
person keeps a list of entities trusted or suspicious, by 
giving them a note of confidence that reflects their 
reputation with other users. Each person is not assigned to 
a role, but a number from 0-1, reflecting the confidence 
level of the individual within the community. 
Otherwise, the system cannot evaluate the identity of the 
original organization and does not take into account the 
context of the individual, for exemple, the device used 
(Smartphone, laptop, etc.). 
5. Synthesis 
This section will be dedicated to the comparison between 
the different approaches presented above, in relation to the 
needs identified in Section 3. The result of the comparison 
is summarized in two tables. The following two mentions 
are used: 
 Yes: The need is supported by the solution. 
 No: The solution is not adapted for this need. 
Table 1: Comparison of systems based on identity 
management 
 
 
 
 
 
Constraints 
Systems based on identity management. 
RADIU
S 
Lemon 
OPE
NID 
Liberty Shib 
WS-
Sec 
Decentralizati
on 
 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interoperabilit
y 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trust  spread Yes No No No No Yes 
Traceability Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Autonomy Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Transparency 
and 
proactivity 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Flexibility No No No No No Yes 
Privacy 
Protection 
No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Scaling 
 
Yes No Yes No No Yes 
  
Table 2: Comparison of systems based on privilege management. 
6. A trust-based security mechanism for 
nomadic users 
In order to fully exploit the concept of spreading the trust 
to interconnect security systems of various domains, we 
propose a generic architecture in which different modules 
are shown in Figure 1: 
 
 
Fig. 1  A trust-based security mechanism for nomadic users 
PEP: Is the external interface of the architecture through 
which pass all the information in the form of certificates, it 
has a particular module called "Trust indicator" and 
reflects the reliability level of the site, the site's reputation, 
the number of links of trust with other sites etc. All these 
information are used to assign a trust level to the site. The 
interface can also verify the veracity of the certificates 
exchanged between the system and the outside thanks to 
the controller of certificates, and provide certificates 
commanded by the PDP, to be sent to entities (user, 
device). 
 
PDP: Allows filtering access to the system via the trust 
controller, and deciding to establish or revoke the trust 
with the sites. It also allows applying the security policy 
defined in the PAP module. 
 
PAP: Is the module where the access control policy is 
defined. 
 
PIP: Allows the capture of the user’s context (device used, 
connection type etc.). It also maintains a table of trusted 
sites updated by the trust controller module of PDP. 
7. Conclusion 
Through this study we came to the conclusions that the 
concept of the propagation of trust in a dynamic way is not 
fully exploited to interconnect the security policies in 
various fields. Reply to this lack could bring us closer to 
our goal of protecting the identity of the users, and this in 
"globalizing" the SSO system across domains: a single 
sign-on (SSO) would not only provide access to several 
domain resources belonging to the user, but also the 
resources of the areas of trust where the user goes, without 
being forced to decline again its identity. This would avoid 
to re-circulate the information of identification / 
authentication at the risk that it would be intercepted by a 
third party.  
Therefore, we proposed a generic architecture, setting up a 
trust-based security mechanism based on reputation and 
trust level accumulated by each domain towards its peers.  
This work is a first step on designing our architecture, and 
the future works will be focused on calculating the value of 
the trust level by providing a function that calculates this 
value. 
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